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Abstract
Hurricane Katrina devastated the city of New Orleans in late August 2005, and debates
are now underway across the country concerning strategies for reconstructing the City. A key to
redevelopment involves encouraging former citizens and businesses to return. Both of New
Orleans’s professional sports teams, the National Football League Saints and the National
Basketball Association Hornets, have taken up residence in other cities, and the question of what
the city should provide in the way of financial accommodation to encourage them to return
should be considered in devising a reconstruction plan.
Infrastructure to facilitate professional sports and mega-events constitutes a significant
fraction of capital budgets for even the largest cities. New Orleans has hosted a disproportionate
share of mega-sports events in the United States given its size and demographics. An important
question concerns whether these events have contributed enough to the New Orleans economy to
justify reinvestment in infrastructure to restore New Orleans’s place as a leading host of
professional sports and mega-events in the United States.
A careful review of the evidence suggests that the redevelopment efforts of New Orleans
are better directed at first providing infrastructure that will encourage the return of its middle
class citizenry and the restoration of its culture. Playing host to professional sports and megaevents does have symbolic significance, but it is arguable that the city cannot afford to invite
guests until it has the means to accommodate them.
JEL Classification Codes: H25, H71, H40, L83, Q54
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I. Introduction
Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans physically and economically after
making landfall on August 29, 2005. Full recovery, which generally follows natural
catastrophes in the United States given the inflow of funds for reconstruction, seems less
certain in the Crescent City. Citizens and businesses that abandoned New Orleans have
exhibited a reluctance to return. The city’s professional sports teams are included among
those enterprises that left New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The National
Football League (NFL) Saints played home games in three different cities during 2005;
the National Basketball Association (NBA) Hornets have taken up residence in
Oklahoma City for their 2005-2006 home games; and the Arena Football League’s
Vodoo have abandoned their entire 2005-2006 schedule.
Saints owner Tom Benson recently announced that the team would return home
for the 2006 season, but their future in the city after the 2006 is unclear (Duncan, 2005).
Benson and the city have had a contentious relationship due largely to the fact that the
Superdome could not compete with the new generation of NFL stadiums as a revenue
producer, prompting Benson to threaten relocation in the absence of a new playing
facility. This relationship has soured further as a consequence of the damage Katrina
inflicted on the Superdome making the need for a new or renovated stadium even more
pronounced. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the extent to which the city of New
Orleans should direct its development dollars toward its sports infrastructure. Has New
Orleans benefited economically from its role as host to major professional sports teams
and a disproportionate number of mega-sports events given its size and demographics?
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Do commercial sport enable a rebuilding of New Orleans’s storm-ravaged infrastructure
or does it force civic trade-offs made even more painful by the storm?
Independent scholarship in general has not supported the thesis that professional
sports induce significant increases in economic activity for host cities. New Orleans,
however, may be different. The city is smaller and less affluent than other host cities in
general, and it may be that the frequency with which large sports events are hosted by
New Orleans makes the area an exception to the experience of most cities with regard to
sports and economic development. The gravity of the city’s economic situation in the
wake of Katrina necessitates an individual and more complete appraisal as strategies for
economic redevelopment are explored.
Answers to the questions raised in this introduction require a review, among other
things, of the damage Katrina wrought, the amount of redevelopment money the city
must commit, and the evidence with regard to the impact sports has on host city
economies. Given the need for these assessments, the paper is organized as follows. The
second section of the paper provides an inventory of Katrina’s damage. Part three
discusses a blueprint for the redevelopment of New Orleans and the role of the leisure
industry in that redevelopment effort. The fourth part of the paper provides information
on the cost of sports infrastructure and teams subsidies in New Orleans. The fifth part of
the paper reviews scholarly work as it relates to the economic impact of sports in general.
The impact sports and mega-events have had on New Orleans is the subject of the sixth
part of the paper. The seventh part of this report assesses whether New Orleans can
afford sports reconstruction. Conclusions and policy implications constitute the paper’s
final section.
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II. Measuring Katrina’s Devastation
Hurricane Katrina, which swept into New Orleans and the Gulf Coast on August
29, 2005, caused far and away the largest damages in real dollar terms of any hurricane in
U.S. history, with uninsured losses topping $100 billion (Bloomberg News, 2005) and
insured losses estimated at $34.4 billion (Powell, 2005). Its final death toll of over 1,400
also places it among the worst natural disasters ever suffered by the United States. New
Orleans was particularly hard hit by the storm, as flood waters remained for weeks after
Katrina while levies were repaired.
Rebuilding New Orleans is an epic undertaking matching in scope and expense in
real terms the rebuilding of San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake or Chicago after the
fire of October 8, 1871. The cost of reconstructing New Orleans has been placed at more
than $100 billion dollars (Tennessean News Service, 2005). Projects that were rejected
prior to Katrina such as a sea wall south of the city to contain water from the Gulf of
Mexico are now being seriously considered, but the estimated cost of this project alone is
$2.5 billion (Tennessean News Service, 2005). The damage to highway infrastructure
has been monumental as a consequence of roads sitting under water for weeks following
the storm. The housing stock experienced devastation that more closely resembles what
has been associated with world wars than hurricanes. New Orleans according to the U.S.
Census Bureau had 188,000 occupied housing units prior to the storm, and approximately
80 percent of that housing was severely damaged by the storm. Some of the extensive
housing damage can be explained by the fact that more than half of the cities 100,000
owner-occupied homes in its 73 neighborhoods were built before 1950 (Tennessean

5

News Service, 2005). The replacement housing will be constructed with potential
hurricane damage in mind, and that will escalate the cost of replacing residential
infrastructure considerably.
The damage to middle class neighborhoods has substantial implications for the
redevelopment effort both as it relates to production and consumption. Without a middle
class New Orleans will not have the workers it needs to run the economy that existed
prior to Katrina, and the spending necessary to restore the economy to pre-hurricane
levels will be deficient. Katrina devastated the housing stock, schools, and other
infrastructure vital to normal life for all socio-economic classes.
The extent of the damage to the social infrastructure must also be carefully
assessed since the return of middle class workers and consumers is essential to the
revitalization of the New Orleans economy. Even before Katrina, by nearly every
measure of economic development, New Orleans lagged behind other large American
cities. As seen in Table 1, for example, labor force participation rates and
employment/population ratios in New Orleans are lower than the national average for
most demographic groups.
Table 1: LFP Rates and Employment/Population Ratios in New Orleans compared
to National Averages
Age (Gender)
LFP rate, Hurricane Damaged
Empl./Pop. Ratio, Hurricane
Areas (National %)
Damaged Areas (National %)
16-24 years (Men)
55.0% (65.0%)
46.1% (55.5%)
16-24 years (Women)
57% (62.0%)
46.0% (54.0%)
25-64 years (Men)
77.0% (82.0%)
72.9% (78.9%)
25-64 years (Women)
n.a.
64.4% (66.7%)
Source: Gabe, et al. (2005).
Hurricane damaged areas in Louisiana have poverty rates above the national
average (21.4% vs. 12.4%), and New Orleans residents are less likely cities (55% vs.
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66%) to live in owner-occupied housing than residents of other large cities (Gabe, et al.,
2005). Finally, the educational attainment of younger adults (age 18 to 34) for stormdamaged areas is generally below that for the rest of the nation. For example, 22.9
percent of young adults in hurricane damaged areas had not completed a high school
degree compared with 20.6 percent nationwide, while only 22.5 percent had completed a
college degree compared with 29.3 percent nationwide (Gabe, et al., 2005).
These figures suggest several things worth noting that have implications for the
likelihood that people displaced will return. First, Katrina hit the economically
disadvantaged hardest. Statistics indicate that other places in the nation to which they
have relocated will improve their opportunities for employment. Second, significant
portions of the middle class were displaced in the storm-ravaged area; 47.4 percent of
those displaced had education equivalent to some college or above (Gabe, et al., 2005).
Third, 45 percent of those displaced did not live in homes that they owned indicating that
a significant portion of the people displaced by Hurricane Katrina have weak financial
ties to the communities they abandoned. A significant permanent displacement of the
population affected by the storm will undermine or may substantially alter the sociodemographic character of neighborhoods mostly adversely affected by the storm. It
should also be noted that virtually entire neighborhoods and parishes were wiped out by
the storm, and devastation of that magnitude may well negate any pull that community
loyalty and ties may exert in bringing people back. It has been estimated, for example,
that Orleans Parish and St. Bernard Parish lost 65.9 and 89.8 percent of their populations
over the period October 2005 to January 2006 (Greater New Orleans Community Data
Center, 2005).
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The report of the Bring Back New Orleans Commission recommended that all of
New Orleans not necessarily be rebuilt. It might well be that if that recommendation is
followed, the post-Katrina New Orleans will be smaller than the pre-Katrina New
Orleans, and that has implications for the ability (willingness) of sports to serve as a
catalyst for economic redevelopment. Prior to considering what sport potentially can
contribute to the redevelopment effort, it is logical to identify a blueprint for
redevelopment. That topic will be discussed in the next section of the paper.

III. A Blueprint for the Redevelopment of New Orleans and the Role of the Leisure
Industry
The New Orleans economy serves the nation as a tourist center and transportation
hub for water transport in particular, and therefore, any economic redevelopment effort
should focus on those traditional industries, an opinion endorsed by members of an ad
hoc committee of urban experts assembled under the auspices of the Urban Land
Institute. Of course, commercial sport is one important aspect of the tourist/leisure
industry, and could play a role in the economic revitalization of New Orleans. A logical
predicate to a discussion sports tourism is to provide some background on the importance
of the tourism industry overall to New Orleans. Much of the tourism industry in New
Orleans is “high-ground” based in the French Quarter, the Central Business District
(CBD), and the Garden District. The Urban Land Institute committee, which met on
November 18, 2005 opined:

New Orleans should concentrate its rebuilding efforts on the sections of
the city that occupy the high ground, while securing lower-lying areas for
potential long-term rebirth…

8

…it’s not practical to redevelop every acre of New Orleans in the short
term, considering that 300,000 residents and 160,000 jobs have been lost.
It’s also not socially equitable to allow residents back into neighborhoods
that do not have adequate levee protection and may be toxic… (Carr,
2005).
Prior to the storm New Orleans attracted more than 10 million visitors who spent
in excess of $5 billion per year according to the New Orleans Metropolitan and Tourism
Bureau. Even though New Orleans is a relatively small city, it ranked fifth in the United
States in the number of conventions hosted (Tennessean News Services, 2005). Tourists
will not likely return to a city that cannot provide essential services, and in the absence of
tourists, the New Orleans economy will flounder compared to pre-Katrina times. One
part of the blueprint for restoration of the New Orleans economy will require restoration
of housing and essential services for its middle class, followed by a reinvigoration of the
tourist trade, followed by a revitalization of those businesses that cater to tourism.
The extent to which professional sports and mega-events contribute to the tourist
trade must be assessed in determining the fraction of scarce capital resources that should
be devoted to the restoration of the infrastructure necessary to accommodate professional
and mega-sports events. The last few years before Hurricane Katrina struck, the city of
New Orleans hosted two major league professional sports teams, several minor league
teams, and a division one collegiate athletic program at Tulane University. In addition,
since opening in 1975, the Superdome has hosted numerous sporting events of national
significance including the NFL’s Super Bowl in 1978, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1997, and 2002,
the National Intercollegiate Athletic Association Men’s Basketball Final Four in 1982,
1987, 1993, and 2003. In addition, the Superdome annually hosts the Sugar Bowl, one of
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college football’s top post-season matches and a game which has determined college
football’s national champion nine times since 1975.
Replacing the infrastructure for professional sports and mega-sports events can be
justified if the benefits provided by the facilities exceed the costs incurred in the
reconstruction. Both costs and benefits have to be measured over time since the facilities
provided a stream of benefits as well generating costs associated with operations and
maintenance (O&M). Comprehensive economic analysis would include not only the
explicit benefits but also the implicit benefits and costs, which are difficult not only to
measure but in many cases to identify.
Before proceeding with quantitative analysis of how much should be spent for
infrastructure reconstruction, the analysis should be framed by considering the potential
for economic development through hosting professional sports or mega-sports events that
utilize the infrastructure New Orleans possesses to accommodate such activity. Data
exist over a period of time for New Orleans and other metropolitan areas for the number
of establishments, annual payroll, and number of employees, collected and arrayed
according to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). These data
are presented at highly aggregated levels (NAICS 2-digit) all the way through to highly
disaggregated levels (NAICS 4-digit) in Table 2. The more disaggregated are the data,
the more incomplete the data set. These limitations compel the construction of a more
aggregated picture of the potential contribution of professional sports and mega events
than is optimal, but reasonable conclusions can be drawn based on the data that are
available. In Table 2, information is recorded on professional sports’ fraction of the three
measures of economic activity previously identified.
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Table 2: Aggregate Measures of the Fraction of New Orleans Economic Activity in
Total Represented by Spectator Sports for 2003
Ratio/NAICS
Number

NAICS 71:
Arts,
Entertainment, and
Recreation

Industry
Employees/New
4.07%
Orleans Total
Annual Industry
Payroll/New Orleans
3.48%
Total
Industry
Establishments/New
1.74%
Orleans Total
Source: County Business Patterns, (2003).

NAICS 711:
Performing Arts,
Spectator Sports, and
Related Industries

NAICS 7112:
Spectator Sports

1.16%

0.62%

1.39%

0.34%

0.94%

0.20%

All data point to the fact that the economic activity accounted for through the
“Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation” industry for New Orleans is small. The
contribution of “Spectator Sports” is less than 1 percent by any of the measures identified
in Table 2. The annual payroll percentage is not atypical for cities in the United States.
The annual payrolls represented by spectator sports for Cook County, the county in which
the Chicago is located, and for Fulton County, the county in which Atlanta resides, are
0.25 percent and 0.89 percent, respectively. Despite the hefty salaries paid professional
athletes, the spectator sports industry typically accounts for less than 1 percent of a city’s
payroll, and, by that measure, the industry is not economically vital to cities in the United
States, including New Orleans.

IV. The Cost of Sports Infrastructure and Team Subsidies in New Orleans
The competition to host sports mega-events and/or a professional sports team is
often as fierce as the competition among athletes on game day. Sports infrastructure is
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vital in not only attracting commercial sport but in retaining teams or events. Prior to
Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans appeared to be on the verge of losing their NFL
franchise, the Saints. Tom Benson, the owner of the Saints, had rejected reportedly the
state’s final offer to keep the Saints in New Orleans in late April of 2005. Details of the
offer to keep the Saints in New Orleans were revealed by Superdome Commission
Chairman Tim Coulon shortly after Benson nixed the state’s proposal. A newspaper
story reported that:
In their “final” offer, state negotiators, led by Coulon, asked the Saints to
pay $40 million – or a little less than 25% -- of a Superdome renovation
now estimated to cost around $174 million. The state also offered to
continue to pay the current annual cash subsidy – totaling $50 million –
until completion of the first phase of renovation for the 2007 season.
After that, under the state’s proposal, the cash payment would have
dropped to $14 million, then to $9.5 million when the renovation was
complete for the 2008 season, but rising 2% annually from there. (USA
Today, 2005)
That plan would have required the state to raise $12 million in new taxes.
The Saints wanted the new schedule of cash payments to begin at $13.5 million in
2008, Coulon said.
“It’s beyond the threshold of pain,” Thornton (Superdome General
Manager Doug Thornton) said of the Saints latest offer, which would
require $4 million in new taxes over what the state offered even if the
Saints also agreed to pay $40 million toward renovations. “What we were
trying to do is reach a framework of an agreement, and to get any taxes
passed would be a Herculian effort.” (USA Today, 2005)
The state’s offer to the Saints to include the annual cash subsidy would place the
team in the top half of the financial standings in the NFL. The fact that the state required
that the Saints pay $40 million, or less than 25 percent of the total cost of Superdome
renovations, places the Saints below the average, 27.2 percent, for team contributions for
NFL stadiums built since 1995 (Baade, 2004). The fact that Benson would reject such an
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offer speaks volumes about the financial realities of the NFL and the inordinate transfer
of business risk from teams to their host cities. The acute aversion to financial risk
practiced by NFL teams has consequences for host cities, and they have achieved tragic
proportions in the case of New Orleans. The behavior of the Saints follows a well worn
financial path, and the behavior of Tom Benson is rational and understandable in light of
the incentive structure he and his fellow owners have authored. Indeed, Mr. Benson
“acknowledged a challenging economic marketplace but cited the increasingly
competitive economics of the NFL,” as the reason for turning down the state’s April 2005
offer (ESPN, 2005).
The risk for Tom Benson is the $81 million he is required to pay if he breaks his
Superdome contract, which he can do following the 2006 season (Konigsmark, 2005).
The $81 million represents the subsidies that the Saints have received since 2001. That
risk pales in comparison to the $1 billion written offer Benson claims to have received for
the team in 2005, a 1,400 percent increase over the $70 million price Benson paid for the
Saints in 1985 (Robinson, 2005). The lucrative offer Benson received for the team
reflects at least in part the money-making potential of NFL teams, which is explained in
large part by the subsidies cities extend to attract a supply of teams that is limited by the
NFL and its owners.
Why would Benson consider leaving New Orleans? The answer, of course, is a
more lucrative offer or better economic prospects by locating in another city such as Los
Angeles, which has been without a team since 1995. The fans in New Orleans have done
their part as they sold out the Superdome 36 straight times before that streak ended late in
2004 (AOL, 2005). But the financial resources of New Orleans fans are limited, and so is
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the number of corporations. Prior to Katrina, among NFL cities, New Orleans was the
fourth in population trailing only Jacksonville, Buffalo, and Green Bay, and the fourth
poorest, trailing Buffalo, Tampa Bay, and Phoenix. Even if New Orleans’ per capita
income were to recover to its pre-Katrina levels, if as few as 25 percent of the population
were to not return, New Orleans would be smaller than any other host city except for
Green Bay, Wisconsin in any of the big four professional American sports leagues.
Corporations play a major role in keeping a team financially competitive. It is
one thing to provide luxury seating; it is another thing to fill those seats. New Orleans
does not serve as a headquarters for many major corporations, and there is not the market
for loges and club seats that can be found in the other NFL cities with whom New
Orleans competes. One writer somewhat whimsically stated the NFL financial equation
in the following way:
Instead of fans, the NFL seeks corporations...While the NBA and Major
League Baseball have guaranteed contracts for their players, the NFL with
its exorbitant TV rights deals and corporate backing has practically given
their owners guaranteed dollars…
The way business is done now is the owner convinces his buddies who
own the largest businesses in their respective cities to buy majority (sic) of
the season tickets and luxury boxes. The result: a term exclusive to the
NFL, the guaranteed sellout. Saints owner Tom Benson can’t do that in
New Orleans because there are no major corporations other than Entergy
to back him. (Terrebonne Parrish Courier, 2005)
Whimsy aside, New Orleans is at a considerable disadvantage in supporting and,
therefore, retaining an NFL franchise or any franchise in one of the four major
professional sports leagues in the United States. The lack of financial capacity creates a
relative shortfall in team revenues, which explains the cash subsidies and tax concessions
New Orleans has had to provide to retain the NFL Saints and the NBA Hornets. New
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Orleans had a total capital budget of $74,627,540 in 2002 (City of New Orleans,
Ordinance #23,957, November 2001). The estimated cost of replacing the Superdome is
$600 million. Spreading that cost over 30 years would constitute 27 percent of the capital
budget for 2002 without considering debt service on the bonds to finance replacing or
renovating the structure.
Following Katrina any plans for replacing the Superdome have been scuttled, but
the city will have to provide for a portion of the costs involved in repairing the facility
and the adjacent New Orleans Arena. It is unclear how much the State of Louisiana will
be spending to renovate the dome. Following Katrina, state officials made clear that they
intended to update the facility so that it would be competitive with the newer structures
that exist in the NFL. There will be new audio and visual equipment, more luxury
seating, concession stands and wider concourses. The Superdome was one of many
buildings damaged by the storm and Louisiana had a $500 million insurance policy on
state buildings along with $100 in flood insurance. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) will also contribute to the rebuilding effort, but the funds will have to be
efficiently allocated.
Given the very small percentage of economic activity in New Orleans accounted
for by the sports industry, it may not be prudent to devote a disproportionate share of
scarce redevelopment funds to that sector. An even stronger argument can be made
against refurbishing the Superdome to accommodate the financial needs of the NFL
Saints since their owner has consistently sought economic concessions from a city and
state that were financially stressed even prior to Katrina. The economic incentive for the
Saints owner to keep the team in New Orleans has been severely compromised by

15

Katrina. Lacking the financial wherewithal to support professional sports following
Katrina, it is not reasonable to expect that the team will make the financial sacrifices that
are necessary as New Orleans attempts to rebuild. There exists no motivation to recoup
fixed or sunk costs by the Saints since their investment in infrastructure has been
minimal. This points to a larger problem with the financial structure of the professional
sports industry throughout the United States. The existence of substantial subsidies for
infrastructure undermines the team commitment to their host cities. Absent any
meaningful risk to their own capital, what incentive do teams have to stay in a city that
experiences a catastrophe on the scale wrought by Hurricane Katrina? There is no
question that the financial risk accompanying hosting professional sports in the United
States is disproportionately borne by the host community. Katrina provides striking
testimony to the reality of how subsidies for sports infrastructure have contributed to that
financial vulnerability.
The argument for subsidies for professional sports has been based on the
economic impact it provides. The “public good” argument that has been used as a
rationale for subsidies is critiqued in the next section of this report.

V. Theory Regarding the Economic Impact of Sport
Independent scholarship arguing against sports as a catalyst for economic
development is abundant. See Noll and Zimbalist (1997) for examples. The debunking of
the theory that commercial sport serves as a catalyst for economic development is based
on economic realities based on budgetary fundamentals and substantial leakages from the
inflow of funds that provide the basis for those who assert sport teams and mega-events
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stimulate the host economy to a nontrivial extent. The often spectacular economic impact
estimates advocates for subsidizing sports infrastructure advance fails to accurately
estimate the economic impact sport has for at least three reasons. First, often the costs
associated with hosting the event, building the structure, or accommodating the team are
treated as expansionary expenditures. Such a tactic ignores the budgetary reality that
money spent on such endeavors precludes spending that money on something else. The
benefit from the use of that money for some other purpose, for example building a levee
as opposed to a stadium, represents a cost to the community and should be considered in
evaluating the efficacy of any project.
Second, the money spent on attending a sports event by residents of the home
team community necessarily precludes them from spending that money on other things.
Furthermore, local expenditures on professional sports may actually reduce total
spending in the economy as opposed to simply reallocating money among competing
ends. Professional sports, which use national resource markets as opposed to locally
owned and operated resources for alternative entertainment or recreational activities, may
foster a net outflow of money. Most of the money spent on a night at a professional
sports event goes to the athletes and owners of the team who may not live in the
community in which they play. Value created in the community by the event or team
play may not be value that the community recognizes in the way of increased incomes,
which are spent again in the community as might be the case with locally owned and
operated entertainment. Professional sports may be a model better described as the circus
coming to town for a temporary stay and leaving with a portion of the income spectators
created through their economic activity within the community.
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Third, to properly gauge the benefit to the public sector, the incremental tax
revenues collected should be net of the incremental explicit costs incurred in hosting the
event or team. The Super Bowl, for example, places a heavy security burden on the host
city, and that cost needs to be identified in estimating the net benefit to the city from
hosting the event.
Taken together the implication of the three qualifiers noted is that the appropriate
measure of the benefit imparted by the subsidy is the measure of net value added. The
inability or unwillingness to recognize the difference between gross expenditures in
conjunction with an event and the net value added it induces explains the substantial
disagreements relating to the economic impact of sports teams and mega-events on host
community economies. Once the economic impact economic of sport is properly
measured, independent scholarship indicates that most teams and mega-events fail to
increase net value added for the host community.
Previous research indicates that the New Orleans Superdome has had a
statistically significant, positive impact on economic activity in New Orleans, but that
positive impact has been offset by a statistically significant, negative impact induced by
the NFL Saints (Baade and Dye, 1990). This result is not surprising. The utilization of
the Superdome has increased over time, and it has been successful in providing a venue
that accommodated events that brought visitors and spending to New Orleans from
outside the metropolis. Professional football, on the other hand, induced substitute
spending that ultimately deflected resident spending to areas outside New Orleans. The
team, furthermore, drained scarce city resources through subsidies that became income
for non resident players, coaches, and owners. The team, as the primary tenant,
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influenced Superdome scheduling and effectively prevented the facility from being
utilized for other events that could have expanded the New Orleans economy.
The spectator sports industry, in light of the preponderance of scholarly evidence,
is properly viewed as a lagging rather than a leading economic activity. Sports yields
hedonic value, in other words, and the quality of life benefit it imparts is a luxury
affordable in affluent communities rather than an activity that helps a community achieve
affluence. Sport for the most part is properly viewed as a luxury good and not a
productive resource.
New Orleans has had an ongoing debate about how much it should spend on
sports infrastructure and to what effect. Katrina has already had an impact on those
deliberations, as it should, because the risks and substitution effects associated with
subsidizing commercial sports activities have been enhanced by the storm for reasons that
are discussed in the next section of the paper.

VI. Spectator Sport and the Revitalization of New Orleans
The damage wrought by Katrina on New Orleans exceeded that of any other
hurricane and rivals in destructive scope the most significant natural disasters in the
history of the United States. What separates the disaster in New Orleans is the extent to
which human failure contributed to the storm’s destructive force. The forty-two breaches
of levees coupled with the failure of government to adequately respond have elevated the
perception of risk. That heightened perception will have implications for the
redevelopment of New Orleans because the extent to which the investment vital for
reconstruction will occur is in part dependent on the risk assumed by investors. A part of
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the reconstruction debate will focus on the Superdome and New Orleans Arena, and it is
important to assess, therefore, what the public can expect in the way of a return on those
investments.
The devastation of the middle and lower-middle classes has a profound impact on
the professional sports industry in New Orleans. These classes provided workers for the
leisure industry as well as other industries, and their abandonment of New Orleans has
impaired the ability of the City to adequately meet the needs of service establishments in
the French Quarter and CBD that cater to the needs of tourists. The loss of the middle
class has diminished consumption in New Orleans, and businesses that serve the retail
needs of this class as well as the tourist industry has been acutely stressed.
The labor shortage makes it doubtful that the Superdome could host a major event
at this juncture. Each event at the Superdome requires approximately 2,500 workers, but
work at the Superdome and New Orleans Arena is occasional and seasonal in keeping
with their events calendars. Family income is augmented by work undertaken in
conjunction with Superdome and New Orleans activity. The massive destruction of the
housing stock in New Orleans in neighborhoods such as the Lower Ninth Ward, Gentilly
Terrace and Woods, and Lakeview requires income to restore that far exceeds that which
can be provided through working events occasionally hosted by the Superdome and New
Orleans Arena. The lack of housing in New Orleans has significant implications for the
ability of the leisure industry in New Orleans in general and the spectator sports industry
in particular to function. A good fraction of the workers at the Superdome and the New
Orleans Arena, even if an event could be physically hosted in those facilities now, would
very likely have to come from some place other than the most devastated areas of New
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Orleans where the middle class lived. The leakage of money from New Orleans through
athletes repatriating their incomes to their primary residences would further be enhanced
by ordinary workers doing the same thing in some appreciable amount because of a lack
of housing in many New Orleans neighborhoods. Post-Katrina, it is even less likely that
income generated through commercial sports activities would remain in the City.
Likewise, the devastation in New Orleans has made it less likely that professional
athletes would remain in the community to spend their money. The lack of social
services and the physical destruction which has transformed New Orleans physically
would compel many with the financial wherewithal to live elsewhere. Thus, Katrina
likely enhanced the size of the substitution effects noted in the previous section of the
paper and enhanced the risk of investment in sports infrastructure substantially.
The money spent on professional sports infrastructure in this environment of
acute housing shortages can only lengthen the restoration of the housing stock and
ultimately frustrate the financial interests of the sports establishment. Some form of
housing has to be provided for workers, and the speed with which housing requests have
been met has been painfully slow. Nearly six months after the storm, of the 135,000
requests for FEMA trailers, only about half have been filled (Steinhauer and Lipton,
2006). Money spent on sports infrastructure is money not spent on housing. Less
housing means fewer local residents working at the Superdome and New Orleans Arena.
Reconstructing the sports facilities, furthermore, at this point deflects construction work
from where it is needed most. The scarcity of habitable houses in New Orleans for
people of relatively modest means has resulted in a significant increase in the prices of
such housing.
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Restoring the Superdome and New Orleans Arena sends the message that New
Orleans is on the road to healing. The message, however, is a tease if those renovated
facilities cannot host events for which local residents provide the necessary labor. A
better reconstruction strategy would be to repair and replace the damaged housing stock
first.
It is hard to imagine the benefit to the city of New Orleans of repairing sports
facilities that the owners will not use due to the compromised economics of events hosted
by those structures, especially for commercial sport. If there are few residents, there will
be few fans. Few fans translates into little spending, and since tax dollars are derived
from the demand for goods and services, tax revenues generated by governments through
activities at the facilities will be less, perhaps appreciably less, than before Katrina.
Indeed, declining business activity following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 had already
resulted in deficit spending by the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District to meet its
cash subsidy obligations to the Saints and Hornets. The shortfall had led to serious
discussions about tax increases for car rentals and hotels in addition to sales tax and
cigarette tax increases prior to Katrina’s arrival. Under present conditions no tax
increases are possible, and it is better from the city’s point of view to have the teams play
elsewhere rather than assume those obligations. If the Saints and Hornets fostered deficit
state spending pre-Katrina of approximately $15 million,1 surely those deficits would
increase substantially following Katrina. The costs to continuing to host professional
sports outweigh the benefits and will continue to do so until the economy can be
reinvigorated beyond pre-Katrina levels.

1

It is interesting to note that the size of the deficit that existed in 2004 of about $19 million approximated
the cash subsidies extended the Saints and Hornets annually (Barrett Sports Group, 2004).
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The professional sports teams in New Orleans would have to be motivated by
something other than their financial self interest to help New Orleans move beyond
Katrina. The evidence is overwhelming that the owner of the New Orleans Saints has
operated pre- and post-Katrina out of financial self interest. Prior to the storm, Benson
sought a new stadium. The evidence indicates that he was reluctant to accept a
refurbished Superdome because Benson apparently believed that an updated Superdome
could not generate sufficient income to allow him to be financially competitive in New
Orleans. When evaluating the nature of the negotiations between Benson and city, the
problem for Benson is New Orleans and not the Superdome. Benson has the option to
move the team to Los Angeles, but Paul Tagliabue, the Commissioner of the NFL, and
the League would have a massive public relations problem if he allowed that move.
While the NFL may share revenues, cities that host teams are hardly given a free ride.
The quid pro quo for having access to revenues generated by NFL teams playing in the
New York and Chicago markets is to build state-of-the-art stadiums that allow each team
to contribute as much as they can to the pool of stadium-generated revenues. Eventually
the NFL will find a way to move the Saints out of New Orleans rather than have the team
become a ward of the League.

VII. Can New Orleans Afford Sports Reconstruction?
The massive destruction of the housing stock in New Orleans is the single largest
obstacle to the restoration of the New Orleans economy to pre-Katrina levels. The
middle class labor force fled New Orleans in substantial numbers, and absent a labor
force, restoration of productivity activity to pre-Katrina levels is impossible. Absent
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productive activity and the income it generates, spending cannot occur that will support
businesses that cater to consumer needs. State and local government tax revenues have
fallen sharply, but, as is true following most natural disasters, the funds for rebuilding
come from the federal government and from private citizens throughout the United States
and world. Clearly those funds should be directed toward housing, but the risks
associated with replacing the housing stock are substantial. The middle class that
abandoned New Orleans has to be convinced that it is safe to return, and they need to
have assurances that the water surrounding the New Orleans bowl is contained.
Insurance companies will have to be convinced as well so that home insurance can be
provided at affordable prices. How to do that with a dependable system of levees and the
reclamation of wetlands is beyond the scope of this report. The focus here is on where
the reconstruction of sports facilities fits into the redevelopment blueprint. The
conclusion is that New Orleans cannot afford the reconstruction of sports facilities on a
scale that will keep the Saints in New Orleans at this time.
Expenditures on the sports facilities that are undertaken should be consistent with
attracting those Superdome related activities that have contributed to the New Orleans
economy. The evidence indicates that the Superdome did account for significant net
value, but the Saints did not. It should be kept in mind, however, that the reconstruction
of the Superdome in the short run should be undertaken only after spending on housing.
Indeed, for a short time longer at least the workers who maintain the hotels and provide
restaurant and bar business are housed in the hotels. A Superdome and convention center
that is up and running tomorrow would bring in guests who displace the workers that
provide guest services. Labor supplies would be forced to come, perhaps, from outside
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the metropolis, and these non resident workers would spend the income they earn outside
New Orleans. The appropriate development strategy for the short and long run is to
replenish the housing stock where appropriate and then rebuild those businesses that
attract nonresident spending. Providing physical accommodation for professional sports
teams does not advance the economics interests of New Orleans in the short term. Doing
so would exacerbate the economic problems that currently exist.

VII. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Hurricane Katrina induced a massive outflow of residents and businesses from the
city of New Orleans. Included among those businesses that fled are the city’s two major
professional sports teams, the NFL Saints and NBA Hornets. The capital costs necessary
to encourage the return of the Saints and the Hornets for the long term are substantial.
The images of the NFL and NBA will be damaged if the Saints and Hornets do not at
least make cameo appearances, but in the longer term, the teams and their leagues will
demand greater revenue streams than can be generated in their current facilities. The fact
that New Orleans and the State of Louisiana were directly subsidizing the teams indicates
that pre-Katrina the teams were not generating revenues in their venues that allowed them
to be financially competitive in their leagues. This paper has concluded that it would be
singularly unwise in the post-Katrina world to direct substantial funds at refurbishing the
Superdome and New Orleans arena to make the teams financially competitive. This
conclusion applies to both the short and longer term. Team financial needs cannot be
accommodated until after the New Orleans economy progresses beyond pre-Katrina
levels, and it is unclear if that will ever happen.
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Capital expenditures on the Superdome replace capital expenditures on housing
and schooling and other middle class amenities that will bring the middle class back.
That is obvious to anyone viewing the situation in New Orleans. What is not so obvious
is the fact that professional sports teams do not contribute in a net sense to a city’s
economy. Scholarly evidence indicates that while the Superdome did contribute to the
New Orleans economy the Saints did not as a consequence of powerful substitution
effects. Those substitution effects would only be enhanced if the city and state tried to
make financial accommodations in an effort to retain the Saints and Hornets in both the
short and longer terms.
Cities in general should be mindful of the fact that subsidies for professional
sports teams eliminate the financial incentives teams would have to remain in the
community following a natural or manmade disaster. Businesses that have risked their
own capital and built infrastructure have a financial stake in their host community. There
is an incentive to recoup their fixed capital costs. The Saints and Hornets have no such
incentive, and the incentive is limited for most professional sports teams throughout the
United States. Paradoxically, cities have contributed in a very substantial way to the
incentive for teams to abandon a city in the face of a disaster on the scale of Katrina.
Given the fact that calamities of the scale of Katrina compromise economies for a very
long time, demographics will not support retaining a team no matter how state of the art a
renovated playing venue the city offers. The owner of the New Orleans Saint, Tom
Benson, was making his way out of New Orleans before Katrina, and the storm has
undoubtedly increased his perception of risk and diminished his financial prospects in
New Orleans to a point that it is not in his financial interest to stay there
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New Orleans will be rebuilt at the grassroots home by home and business by
business. The rebuilding of New Orleans will not occur purely out of economic incentive
but because people are attached emotionally to their city. The economic motivation
comes from recouping their fixed costs. If businesses cannot cover their variable costs of
operation in relatively short order, they will leave. The best way to cover the variable
costs is to encourage consumers to return to the community, and therefore, government’s
role should be to do what they can to encourage the return of the middle class. To this
end, the order of capital expenditures in New Orleans should be levees, housing, middle
class amenities, infrastructure for nonresident businesses, and last those industries that
cater to the entertainment needs of the middle class.
The role of sports in the economic recovery of the city is dubious other than
serving as a symbol that the city remains vital. The repair of the Superdome and the New
Orleans Arena is an expensive tease in that regard, but does little to provide what is
needed for the community to recover from the storm. Sports and the hosting of megaevents may actually undermine longer term recovery through deflecting capital spending
from where it is needed most and crowding out those workers and residents who are
involved in the essential rebuilding process. Any activity which contributes to an
increased outflow of funds must be avoided. The cost of leisure options is too great.
Sport may provide hedonic value, but at this juncture hedonic value and the economic
interests of the sport elites must, out of financial and developmental necessity, take a
back seat in the interest of the greater good.
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